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“At bottom, [TC HEARTLAND] is nothing more than a 
request for an ill-conceived, one-size-fits-all judicial end-run 
around existing legislative policy decisions.”1 
— Amicus Curiae, The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA) 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On February 4, 2016, Martin Shkreli visited Capitol Hill.2  As CEO of Turing 
Pharmaceuticals, Shkreli faced Congressional pressure for Turing’s purchase of 
an old drug, Daraprim, and the company’s decision to hike the price from $13.50 
to $750 per dose.3 Though headlines focused on Shkreli’s newfound infamy as 
“PhRMA Bro,” the underlying issue “ha[d] as much to do with the Food and 
Drug Administration as Shkreli: although the drug’s patent expired in the 
nineteen-fifties, the F.D.A. certification process for generic drugs is grueling 
enough that, for the moment, whoever owns Daraprim has a virtual monopoly 
in America.”4  In short, Shkreli’s company could increase Daraprim’s price as 
high as they wished because the FDA approval process for a generic was so 
onerous to initiate that, even though Daraprim’s patent expired years ago, the 
drug faced no competition.5 
The Daraprim saga is far from unique.  As of October 30, 2017, the FDA 
announced that at least 319 pharmaceutical drugs in the United States had 
expired patents but no generic competitor.6  Lomustine, a forty-year-old drug 
used to treat multiple types of cancer, was purchased by NextSource 
 
 1 Brief of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Groups Brands LLC, 
137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341). 
 2 Haley Sweetland Edwards, Pharma ‘Bad Boy’ Martin Shkreli Mocks Congress, TIME (Feb. 4, 
2016), time.com/4207931/martin-shkreli-congress-turning-pharmaceutical-hearing/. 
 3 Jordan Weissmann, How the Government Could Punish That Hedge Fund Bro Who Wanted to 
Raise a Drug’s Price 5,000 Percent, SLATE: MONEYBOX (Sept. 23, 2015, 8:48 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/09/23/martin_shkreli_and_daraprim_how_
the_government_could_stop_his_drug_price.html. 
 4 Kelefa Sanneh, Everyone Hates Martin Shkreli. Everyone Is Missing the Point, NEW YORKER 
(Feb. 5, 2016), https: //www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/everyone-hates-
martin-shkreli-everyone-is-missing-the-point. 
 5 Weismann, supra note 3. 
 6 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LIST OF OFF-PATENT, OFF-EXCLUSIVITY DRUGS WITHOUT 
AN APPROVED GENERIC (2017). 
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Biotechnology in 2013; between 2013 and 2017, the price increased 1,400 
percent.7  The company justified the pricing increase based on “product-
development costs, regulatory-agency fees, and the benefit the treatment delivers 
to patients.”8  Normally, massive price increases for an off-patent drug 
(regardless of their justification) would encourage generic competition, but 
generic drug manufacturers have been deterred by “big entry costs and time 
commitments associated with obtaining regulatory approval” by the FDA.9 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, or Hatch-
Waxman Act,10 was designed in order to ensure healthy competition between 
branded and generic pharmaceuticals and prevent companies like Turing and 
NextSource from engaging in price gouging.11  Signed into law in 1984, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act was drafted with two “competing goals in mind: to spur new 
pharmaceutical development and to encourage greater public access to generic 
drugs.”12  Periods of market exclusivity were given to brand-name 
pharmaceutical manufacturers,13 while their generic competitors were given 
expedited review of their FDA application for approval to enter the market.14  
Although the Hatch-Waxman Act was at first successful in balancing the 
interests of these two groups, in recent years, the FDA’s slow approval process 
has deterred generic pharmaceutical corporations from entering the market to 
compete with brand-name companies.15 
In March 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court unwittingly backed into a solution 
that mitigates the impact of the FDA’s problematic approval process.  In TC 
Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC,16 the Supreme Court turned a 
 
 7 Peter Loftus, Cancer Drug Price Rises 1,400% With No Generic to Challenge It, WALL ST.  J. 
(Dec. 25, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cancer-drug-price-rises-1400-with-
no-generic-to-challenge-it-1514203201. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).  The Act’s common name, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, is derived from the original sponsors of the bill as introduced in Congress, Senator Orrin 
Hatch and Representative Henry Waxman. 
 11 David Crow, Waxman hits out at Allergan patent deal with Mohawk tribe, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 8, 
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/81bd8930-abb8-11e7-aab9-abaa44b1e130 (quoting 
Henry Waxman as saying that “[w]hen drafting the Hatch-Waxman Act, Senator Hatch and I 
worked hard to find a balance that would promote price competition while providing at the 
same time incentives for manufacturers”). 
 12 Allen M. Sokal & Bart A. Gerstenblith, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Encouraging Innovation and 
Generic Drug Competition, 10 CURRENT TOPICS ON MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY 1950 (2010). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Currently, 80% of American prescriptions are for generic drugs.  However, drug prices 
have increased massively in recent years. Weissmann, supra note 3. 
 16 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
4
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss2/6
NEWTON (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2018  1:42 PM 
 
2018] TIGHTENING THE GILSTRAP 259 
long-standing interpretation of the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400, on its 
head.  Part (b) of the statute provides that a patent suit “may be brought in the 
judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has 
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of 
business.”17  For the twenty-seven years prior to TC Heartland, U.S. courts had 
followed the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 1400(b), thereby gifting the 
court the moniker “de facto supreme court of patents.”18  The Federal Circuit 
interpreted the statute’s reference to a defendant’s residence expansively, finding 
venue proper anywhere the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction.19  
Doing so gave extensive “flexibility to pharmaceutical companies . . . bringing 
Hatch-Waxman cases,”20 so Hatch-Waxman suits were filed almost exclusively 
in Delaware and New Jersey, where most branded pharmaceutical companies 
were incorporated.21 
Though plaintiffs’ “forum-selection flexibility”22 lasted nearly thirty years, in 
TC Heartland, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit and limited a 
corporation’s residence to “the state of incorporation only”23 by relying on a 
narrower 1957 interpretation of § 1400(b) in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products 
Corp.24  As a result, the TC Heartland decision led patent plaintiffs to rely on the 
second prong of § 1400(b), where a defendant commits “acts of infringement” 
 
 17 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2016). 
 18 Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 
387 (2001). 
 19 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1990), 
abrogated by TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017); see 
also Toombs v. Goss, 768 F. Supp. 62, 63 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[A] corporation now is a resident 
of a district if it is subject to personal jurisdiction in that district.”); Braden Shielding Sys. v. 
Shielding Dynamics, 812 F. Supp. 819, 821 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“To the extent that Fourco and 
VE Holding conflict, we must favor VE Holding . . .”); Hester Industries Inc. v. Stein Inc., No. 
96-719-A, 1996 WL 710835, at *1–2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 3, 1996) (“[T]he standards for personal 
jurisdiction and venue involve weighing the same elements . . .”); Pfizer Inc. v. Synthon 
Holding, B.V., 386 F. Supp. 2d 666, 679 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (“The Federal Circuit holds that a 
defendant ‘resides’ in a district if it is subject to personal jurisdiction there.”). 
 20 Paul A. Ainsworth & Joshua I. Miller, Practical Issues for the Pharmaceutical and 
Biopharmaceutical Industry in the Wake of TC Heartland, NAT’L L. REV. 1, 1(May 23, 2017), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/practical-issues-pharmaceutical-and-
biopharmaceutical-industry-wake-tc-heartland (citing VE Holding Corp.., 917 F.2d at 1574). 
 21 The Supreme Court’s TC Heartland Decision: Implications for Hatch-Waxman Litigation, ARENT 
FOX LLP (May 25, 2017), https://www.arentfox.com/newsroom/alerts/supreme-
court%E2%80%99s-tc-heartland-decision-implications-hatch-waxman-litigation. 
 22 Ainsworth, supra note 20, at 2. 
 23 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2017). 
 24 353 U.S. 222, 226 (1957). 
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and has a “regular and established place of business,”25 in order to find a proper 
venue.  For Hatch-Waxman litigants, relying on the second prong of § 1400(b) 
created an “impenetrable problem”26 because “the unique [forward-looking] 
posture of pharmaceutical litigation”27 contradicts the “backward-looking, 
historical conduct” 28 of § 1400(b)’s second prong.  District courts since TC 
Heartland have split when considering how to resolve this issue and apply the 
second prong of § 1400(b) in the Hatch-Waxman context, 29 leaving brand-name 
pharmaceutical plaintiffs uncertain as to where they can sue their generic 
competitors.30  Thus, though “venue decisions . . . can be essential for both 
plaintiffs and defendants,”31 litigation since TC Heartland “bodes well for 
defendants (accused infringers) seeking to defend patent cases on their home turf 
or otherwise seeking a more favorable forum”32 because of the newfound 
difficulty for pharmaceutical plaintiffs in finding a proper venue. 
Branded pharmaceutical companies urge that TC Heartland disrupts the 
“carefully crafted balance[ ]” in the Hatch-Waxman Act and “serves no purpose 
except to invite harassment, enable and encourage inconsistent results, and waste 
the innovator’s time and resources.”33  Nevertheless, this Note argues that the 
newfound difficulty TC Heartland imposes on branded pharmaceutical 
companies reinforces the goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act by restoring market 
 
 25 See OptoLum, Inc. v. Cree, Inc., No. CV-16-03828-PHX-DLR, 2017 WL 3130642, at *1 
(D. Ariz. July 24, 2017) (finding that TC Heartland “made clear that a corporation ‘resides’ only 
in its State of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute”); see also Boston Sci. 
Corp. v. Cook Grp., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 229, 244 (D. Del. 2017) (Noting that after TC 
Heartland, “the issue of how to determine what is and is not a regular and established place of 
business is arising before courts with increased frequency.”). 
 26 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 17-397-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155, at 
*6 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017). 
 27 Christina A. Ondrick et al., U.S. Supreme Court Limits Venue Under the Patent Statute in TC 
Heartland, PAUL HASTINGS LLP (May 23, 2017), https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-
items/details/?id=9a75ec69-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded. 
 28 Bristol-Myers, No. 17-397-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155, at *7. 
 29 Compare Bristol-Myers, 2017 WL 3980155, at *7, with Galderma Labs., L.P. v. Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01076-M, 2017 WL 6505793, at *1, *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 
2017). 
 30 Scott W. Doyle et al., What is a ‘Regular and Established Place of Business?, FRIED FRANK LLP 
(July 10, 2017), http://www.friedfrank.com/index.cfm?pageID=25&itemID=7812. 
 31 Jake Holdreith et al., New Strategies for Venue in Hatch-Waxman Litigation, 13 PLIR 372, 374, 
Mar. 13, 2015 (arguing that delays in the disposition of venue suits are harmful to generic 
manufacturers: “even when a generic ultimately wins on the merits, if the resolution takes too 
long, it can effectively be a win for the brand”). 
 32 Franklin D. Kang & Lyle D. Kossis, Federal Circuit Issues First Published Decision Applying 
High Court’s T.C. Heartland Decision Regarding Patent Venue, MCGUIREWOODS: LEGAL ALERT 
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2017/9/ 
Federal-Circuit-Published-Decision-TC-Heartland-Patent-Venue.aspx. 
 33 Brief of PhRMA supra note 1, at *2–4. 
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competition.  To do so, Part Two of this Note will examine the maturity of the 
patent venue provision, § 1400(b) and the development of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in TC Heartland.  In Part Three, this Note will analyze the options 
available to pharmaceutical plaintiffs to clarify confusion in patent infringement 
suits, including filing a protective suit, requesting consolidation through 
multidistrict litigation, and encouraging Congressional action.  This Note finds 
the first two solutions untenable due to their high cost, and ultimately argues that 
Congress’s failure to act is beneficial in the pharmaceutical context because, by 
making it more difficult for pharmaceutical plaintiffs to file suit, generic 
manufacturers are once again able to enter the market and compete with brand-
name manufacturers. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  NARROW BEGINNINGS 
1. Creation of the Patent Venue Statute.  As the Supreme Court notes at the 
beginning of TC Heartland,34 the continually-changing, century-long history of 
patent venue provisions is crucial to parse the language of the present statute.  
Congress first enacted a venue statute specific to patents in 189735 and put patent 
infringement cases “in a class by themselves, outside the scope of general venue 
legislation.”36  For the next forty-five years, courts interpreted the patent-specific 
venue statute to be the exclusive provision governing venue for patent 
infringement suits,37 whereby suits could be filed in the district where the 
defendant was an “inhabitant” or in the district where the defendant “committed 
acts of infringement” and had a “regular and established place of business.”38  In 
1942, the Supreme Court justified its continued adherence to the exclusivity of 
the patent venue provision by arguing that its purpose in defining the exact 
jurisdictional parameters would be undermined if the provision was interpreted 
to “dovetail with the general [venue] provisions.”39 
In 1948, Congress “re-codified” the statute as § 1400(b) and replaced the 
word “inhabit[s]” with the word “resides.”40  Separately, the 1948 Act also 
 
 34 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1518 (2017) (“The 
history of the relevant statutes provides important context for the issue in this case.”). 
 35 Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695. 
 36 Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706, 713 (1972). 
 37 See Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942) (determining that 
§ 1400 “is the exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement proceedings”). 
 38 Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695. 
 39 315 U.S. at 566. 
 40 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1518–19 (2017) 
(citing Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 936). 
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established § 1391, the general venue statute,41 which defines corporate residence 
“for venue purposes” broadly as “any judicial district in which [the corporation] 
is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business . . . “42 
Although intended to eliminate confusion about venue in patent 
infringement suits, re-codification only muddied the waters and created a circuit 
split43 because courts were unclear whether the new use of “resides” in § 1400(b) 
fell under the definition of “residence” in § 1391(c).44  To resolve the split, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1957 in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products 
Corp. and examined whether § 1400(b) was the “sole and exclusive provision 
controlling venue in patent infringement actions.”45 
2.  The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Fourco.  In Fourco, the Supreme Court 
considered whether 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), the patent venue provision, was 
“supplemented” by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), the general patent statute.46  Transmirra 
sued Fourco, a West Virginia corporation, in the Southern District of New York 
for patent infringement.47  Transmirra alleged that Fourco resided in the 
Southern District of New York for venue purposes because it was “actively 
inducing infringement” of Transmirra’s patented invention by “making, selling 
or using television receivers, television cathode ray receiving tubes or other 
devices . . . within the Southern District of New York.”48  In finding that Fourco 
had not demonstrated the requisite acts of infringement in S.D.N.Y., the 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the general venue provision 
supplemented § 1400(b) and found that patent infringement suits could be 
brought exclusively in either “the judicial district where the defendant resides, or 
where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and 
 
 41 See id. at 1519 (noting that when Congress “recodified the patent venue statute . . . [it] 
also enacted the general venue statute”). 
 42 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952). 
 43 See Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 224 n.3 (1957) (finding 
that “[t]he Third Circuit, in Ackerman v. Hook, 183 F.2d 11, the Seventh Circuit in C-O-Two Fire 
Equipment Co. v. Barnes, 194 F.2d 410, and the Tenth Circuit, in Ruth v. Eagle-Picher Company, 
225 F.2d 572, as well as numerous District Courts, have held that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) alone 
controls venue in patent infringement cases, while, on the other hand, the Fifth Circuit, in 
Dalton v. Shakespeare Co., 196 F.2d 469, and in Guiberson Corp. v. Garrett Oil Tools, Inc., 205 F.2d 
660, and several District Courts, have held that the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) are to be 
read into, and as supplementing, § 1400(b), as the Second Circuit held in this case, and that, 
hence, a corporation may be sued for patent infringement in any district where it merely ‘is 
doing business’ ”). 
 44 TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1519. 
 45 Fourco, 353 U.S. at 229. 
 46 Id. at 222. 
 47 Id. at 223. 
 48 Transmirra Prods. Corp. v. Fourco Glass Co., 133 F. Supp. 531, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), 
rev’d 353 U.S. 222 (1957)). 
8
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss2/6
NEWTON (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2018  1:42 PM 
 
2018] TIGHTENING THE GILSTRAP 263 
established place of business.”49  In other words, patent venue under § 1400(b) 
is more restrictive than the general § 1391 venue provision. Crucially, the Fourco 
Court based its argument on its interpretation of Congressional intent: the Court 
relied on the distinction between the “general language” of § 1391(c) and the 
“specific terms” of § 1400(b)50 to decide that § 1391(c) did not control because 
“nothing in the 1948 recodification evidenced [congressional] intent to alter that 
status.”51 
B.  PATENT VENUE EXPANSION 
In 1988, Congress amended § 1391 and altered the statutory language relied 
on by the Supreme Court in Fourco.52 
1.  The 1988 Amendment.  At the time Fourco was decided, § 1391(c) ended with 
the qualifier “for venue purposes.”53  The 1988 amendment split the statute into 
two sentences54 and established new “exact and classic language.”55  The new 
language made it clear that “for purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that 
is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject 
to personal jurisdiction . . . “56  Though the Supreme Court was silent on the issue, 
the Federal Circuit in 1990 found that the 1988 amendment broadened the scope 
of § 1391(c) to incorporate the definition of residence in § 1400(b), thus 
rendering § 1400(b) meaningless.57 
2.  The Federal Circuit’s Ruling in VE Holding.  In 1990, the Federal Circuit in 
VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co. found that a corporate defendant 
resided anywhere it was subject to personal jurisdiction.58  The Federal Circuit 
seized what they viewed to be an open door to reformulate case law on patent 
infringement59 and justified its departure from Fourco by relying on the 1988 
 
 49 Fourco, 353 U.S. at 228–29. 
 50 Id. (“Specific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which 
otherwise might be controlling.” (citing Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin 
Tomkins Co., 322 U.S. 102, 107 (1944))). 
 51 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2017).  The 
Heartland Court also noted that in Fourco, the Court also determined that “ ‘resides’ in the 
recodified version . . . bore the same meaning as ‘inhabits.’ “  Id. (citing Fourco, 353 U.S. at 
226). 
 52 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 912 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 53 Id. 
 54 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988). 
 55 VE Holding, 917 F.2d at 1579. 
 56 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013(a), 102 
Stat. 4669 (emphasis added). 
 57 See VE Holding, 917 F.2d 1574. 
 58 Id. at 1579 (“Section 1391(c) as it was in Fourco is no longer.”). 
 59 Id. at 1575 (“This is a case of first impression.”). 
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amendment to the general venue provision.60  VE Holding arose from a dispute 
between two competitors about the patentability of agricultural tools.61  Plaintiff 
VE Holding Corporation filed suit against California Pellet Mill Company and 
Johnson Gas Appliance Company62 in the Northern District of California, 
alleging patent infringement and inducement to infringe.  Defendant Johnson 
moved to dismiss, arguing that, as an Iowa corporation with no regular and 
established place of business in the Northern District of California, venue was 
improper there.63  While the district court in California rejected defendant’s 
arguments, the Federal Circuit found that Congress would have made its 
intentions explicit if it had intended § 1400(b) to be excepted from the 1988 
amendment.64  The Federal Circuit found instead that § 1391(c) now indicated 
“a clear intention” that the general statute “expressly read[ ] itself into the specific 
statute” of § 1400(b) in order to “define a term,” rather than supplant the specific 
patent statute entirely.65  Thus, the Federal Circuit found that “the precedential 
status of Fourco was no more.”66  With the freedom to establish the parameters 
of this “matter of first impression,”67 the Federal Circuit in VE Holding ultimately 
determined that the test for venue in patent infringement suits “is whether the 
defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction” under § 1391, as is the case in 
any other civil litigation.68 
3.  The Venue Act.  Courts generally applied VE Holding in patent infringement 
suits until the Supreme Court decided TC Heartland.69  Importantly, this trend 
continued even after a second amendment to the general venue provision.  In 
2011, Congress passed the Venue Act, which added a preface to § 1391(a) stating 
 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 1576. 
 62 Plaintiff ultimately filed two suits.  In VE Holding I, plaintiff sued both California Pellet 
Mill and Johnson Gas Appliance.  In VE Holding II, plaintiff filed suit against Johnson alone. 
Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 1579 (“Congress could readily have added ‘except for section 1400(b),’ if that 
exception, which we can presume was well known to the Congress, was intended to be 
maintained. Certainly it would not be sensible to require Congress to say, ‘For purposes of this 
chapter, and we mean everything in this chapter.’ “) (emphasis in original). 
 65 Id. at 1580. 
 66 Id. at 1579. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 1584. 
 69 See, e.g., Price v. Code-Alarm, Inc., No. 91 C 699, 1991 WL 134188 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 
1991); Meteoro Amusement Corp. v. Six Flags, 267 F. Supp. 2d 263 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Sanofi-
Aventis v. Synthon Holding BV, No. 1:07cv86, 2008 WL 819295, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 20, 
2008); Imageware Sys., Inc. v. WCC Servs. US, Inc., No. 13cv309 DMS (JMA), 2013 WL 
12097556 (S.D. Cal. June 17, 2013). 
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that the section only applied “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.”70  
Nevertheless, district courts found that this so-called “saving clause”71 did not 
“undermine the conclusion”72 in VE Holding. Instead, courts interpreted the 
altered language to be “even broader than the language it replaced” because the 
updated language was applicable to all venue statutes, not just venue statutes 
under title twenty-eight of the U.S. Code.73 
C.  AT THE HEART OF IT 
Six years after Congress passed the Venue Act, the Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments regarding § 1400(b) and § 1391(c) for the first time since its 1957 
Fourco decision,74  and on May 22, 2017, the Court published its decision in TC 
Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC.75 
1.  The Supreme Court in TC Heartland.  TC Heartland arose in the context of a 
dispute between competitors who both manufacture flavored drink mixes.76  TC 
Heartland is an Indiana company headquartered in Indiana; although it “is not 
registered to conduct business in Delaware and has no meaningful local presence 
there,” TC Heartland was sued by Kraft in a Delaware district court because of 
its shipment of the alleged infringing products into the state.77  The district court 
rejected TC Heartland’s argument that it neither resided in Delaware nor had a 
regular and established place of business there, and the Federal Circuit denied 
TC Heartland’s petition for writ of mandamus, both courts citing the flexible 
 
 70 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (2016). 
 71 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1516 (2017). 
 72 Script Sec. Sols. L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d 928, 933 (E.D. Tex. 2016) 
(“[T]he analysis in VE Holding is just as applicable to the post-2011 version of the venue statute 
as it was to the pre-2011 version.”) Id. at 934; see also TeleSign Corp. v. Twilio, Inc., No. CV 
15-3240 PSG (Ssx), 2015 WL 12765482, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2015) (“The 
Court . . . declines to hold that VE Holdings is no longer good law.”). 
 73 Script Sec. Sols., 170 F. Supp. 3d at *934 (“The 1988 version of section 1391(c) made its 
provisions applicable ‘[f]or purposes of venue under this chapter,’ while the 2011 version of 
section 1391 makes its provisions applicable ‘[f]or all venue purposes.’ “) (emphasis added). 
 74 Keith Grady & Karen Morris, Denying TC Heartland Changed the Law on Venue Ignores Reality, 
IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 8, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/10/08/denying-tc-
heartland-changed-law-venue-ignores-reality/id=88227/. 
 75 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
 76 Id. at 1517.  Note that although neither entity is incorporated, respondent alleged the 
competitors were corporations in its complaint and petitioner admitted this allegation in its 
answer.  As a result, this Note, like the Court, does not address the question of whether 
§ 1400(b) applies to unincorporated entities. 
 77 Id. 
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venue landscape from VE Holding.78  The Federal Circuit found that VE Holding 
“firmly resolved” any confusion regarding patent venue and refused to 
reconsider this “settled precedent for over 25 years.”79  The Federal Circuit also 
rejected TC Heartland’s claim that the 2011 amendments overruled VE Holding 
and re-codified Fourco by arguing that “there was no established governing 
Supreme Court common law” to codify after the 1988 amendment to § 1391.80  
TC Heartland petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari to determine whether 
the 2011 amendments meant that § 1391(c) supplemented § 1400(b).81 
The Supreme Court found that the Venue Act did not alter the scope of the 
patent venue statute for two reasons.  First, the Court relied on a 1966 case, Pure 
Oil Co v. Suarez,82 to find that the shift in § 1391’s language from “for venue 
purposes” to encompass “all venue purposes” made no material difference “to 
the already comprehensive provision.”83  Second, the Court found that the 
addition of the savings clause to § 1391 solidified the Court’s position as to 
Congressional intent.84  Contrary to the Federal Circuit’s belief that the savings 
clause made the general venue statute “even broader,”85 the Supreme Court 
found that the clause “expressly state[d]” that some venue provisions are exempt 
from the default definition of residence if they provide their own distinct 
definition.86  Because the Court had found that § 1391 did not govern in Fourco, 
even when the statute contained no exceptions, the Court reasoned that the 
savings clause meant the Fourco holding “rest[ed] on even firmer footing now . . . 
“87 
In the short, eight-page opinion, the Court makes one final observation: it 
dismisses TC Heartland’s argument that the 2011 amendment ratified the Federal 
Circuit’s VE Holding opinion.88  Instead, the Court directly contradicts the 
Federal Circuit, noting that the lower court relied “heavily” on the 1988 
 
 78 Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, No. 14-28-LPS, 2015 WL 5613160, 
at *1–2 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2015); In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016), 
rev’d sub nom, TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
 79 In re TC Heartland, 821 F.3d at 1341 
 80 Id. at 1341–42. 
 81 TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1521. 
 82 Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202 (1966). 
 83 TC Heartland, 137 S.Ct. at 1520 (citing Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 204–05 
(1966)) (In Pure Oil, the Court found that the phrase “for venue purposes” cover[ed] “all venue 
statutes.”). 
 84 Id. at 1521 (“This particular argument is even weaker . . . because the current provision 
includes a saving clause expressly stating that it does not apply when ‘otherwise provided by 
law.’ “). 
 85 Script Sec. Sols. L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d 928, 934 (2016). 
 86 TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. at 1521. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
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amendment that specified that the general venue statute applied to provisions 
“under this chapter.”89  Congress eliminated this language in 2011, which the 
Supreme Court found indicative of Congressional intent to distance the statute 
from its 1988 formulation and realign its interpretation with the Fourco-era text.90  
In short, the TC Heartland Court determined that because “nothing in the text” 
indicates Congress intended to approve VE Holding, the sixty-five-year-old 
decision in Fourco remained binding precedent and venue was improper for TC 
Heartland in Delaware.91 
2.  Judge Gilstrap’s ‘Rocket Docket.’  Following the Court’s TC Heartland decision, 
patent case filings shifted dramatically.  Prior to the ruling, thirty-six percent of 
patent cases filed in the U.S. in 2016 were brought in the Eastern District of 
Texas,92 where Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the Eastern District heard almost one 
out of every four patent venue suits filed nationwide. 93  Known as the “Rocket 
Docket,” Texas’ Eastern District “actively cultivate[d], or at least tolerate[d], an 
image as the go-to jurisdiction” 94 for patent trolls.95  In the first six weeks after 
TC Heartland, however, just fourteen percent of cases were filed there;96 instead, 
the District of Delaware (where, as of 2016, almost sixty-seven percent of U.S. 
Fortune 500 companies are incorporated97) saw a nearly sixteen-percent jump in 
case filings, followed by an increase in case filings in Silicon Valley’s Central and 
Northern Districts of California.98  For patent trolls, filing in the district of 
Delaware under the first prong of § 1400(b) presented an “obvious workaround” 
to the uncertainty created by TC Heartland because “patent suits there typically 
rule in favor of” those entities.99 
 
 89 Id. (quoting § 1391(c) (1988 ed.)). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Benjamin Anger & Boris Zelkind, Where Plaintiffs Are Filing Suit Post-TC Heartland, 
LAW360 (July 7, 2017, 12:20 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/942115/where-
plaintiffs-are-filing-suit-post-tc-heartland. 
 93 Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation in the 
Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017). 
 94 Id. at 3–4. 
 95 Id. Patent trolls are “companies formed solely for the purpose of monetizing patent rights 
through litigation, often using methods that seem to leverage the costs and burdens of 
litigation more so than the value of the patented technology.” Id. at 3. 
 96 Anger & Zelkind, supra note 92. 
 97 Delaware Division of Corporations, 2016 Annual Report, https://corp.delaware.gov/ 
2016AnnualReport.pdf. 
 98 Anger & Zelkind, supra note 92. The leap in California filings can be attributed to the 
high volume of technology companies headquartered in Silicon Valley. Id. 
 99 Robert Stoll, What Changes Result from the Supreme Court Decision in TC Heartland?, 
IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 6, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/09/06/changes-result-
supreme-court-decision-tc-heartland/id=87612/. 
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Nevertheless, high “court congestion” in Delaware led to additional difficulty 
for patent infringement litigants.100  Down to only two active judges, Delaware 
courts resorted to “lobbing cases to other courts, mean[ing that] patent holders 
who want to keep their infringement lawsuits in that court are facing new 
uncertainty.”101  As an alternative, patent plaintiffs began filing suit under the 
previously under-utilized second prong of § 1400 (b), which permits an assertion 
of venue anywhere the defendant has committed “acts of infringement and has 
a regular and established place of business.”102  It is under the second prong of 
§ 1400 that Judge Rodney Gilstrap reasserted the Eastern District of Texas’s 
relevance as a haven for patent infringement plaintiffs.103 
3.  The Federal Circuit in Raytheon v. Cray.  On June 29, 2017, the Eastern 
District of Texas considered residency for venue purposes in Raytheon Co. v. Cray, 
Inc.104  Raytheon alleged that Cray infringed on its four computer-related patents 
by selling computers to customers in Texas and inducing others to use the 
products.105  Because Cray is incorporated in the State of Washington, the 
Eastern District quickly dismissed venue under the first prong of § 1400(b)106 
before considering whether Cray had committed “acts of infringement” in the 
district and whether Cray had a regular and established place of business there.107 
The court determined that Cray had commitment acts of infringement based 
on two allegations by Raytheon: (1) Cray induced patent infringement by 
supercomputer users in the Eastern District; and (2) Cray infringed on 
Raytheon’s patent when a Cray employee offered to sell a supercomputer while 
working in the Eastern District.108  Finding these allegations sufficient to 
constitute acts of infringement for the purposes of establishing proper venue, 
the Eastern District then considered whether Cray had a regular and established 
place of business in the district.109  The district court lamented the Supreme 
Court’s failure in TC Heartland to clear up a circuit split regarding what constitutes 
a regular and established place of business:110 While some courts have 
traditionally required a “physical presence in the district” for the place of 
 
 100 Malathi Nayak, Swelling Docket Pushing Delaware Judges to Transfer Patent Cases, 86 USLW 
(BNA) No. 11 (Sept. 28, 2017). 
 101 Id. 
 102 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2016). 
 103 See Stoll, supra note 99. 
 104 258 F. Supp. 3d 781 (E.D. Tex. 2017), mandamus granted, order vacated, sub nom, In Re Cray 
Inc., 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 105 Id. at 784 
 106 Id. at 788. 
 107 Id. at 788–99. 
 108 Id. at 789–90. 
 109 Id. at 792. 
 110 Id. 
14
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol25/iss2/6
NEWTON (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2018  1:42 PM 
 
2018] TIGHTENING THE GILSTRAP 269 
business to be regular and established,111 others have historically been less 
strict.112  Without Supreme Court precedent to rely on, the Eastern District relied 
on a 1985 Federal Circuit opinion, In re Cordis Corp.113 to find that a single 
employee in the Eastern District was sufficient to constitute a regular and 
established place of business.114 
In Cordis, a Minnesota corporation filed a patent infringement suit in 
Minnesota against a Florida corporation.115  The defendant had two full-time 
sales representatives based in Minnesota and hired a Minnesota secretarial service 
to receive Cordis’s goods and messages, but alleged that it did not have a regular 
and established place of business because it was not registered to do business in 
Minnesota, did not have a bank account there, and did not lease or own any 
property in the state.116  The Federal Circuit found those contacts were 
insufficient to warrant granting petitioner’s writ of mandamus, declaring that 
“the appropriate inquiry” is whether Cordis has a “permanent and continuous 
presence,” not whether the corporation has a “fixed physical presence.”117  
Because the Eastern District in Cray viewed the Cray employee’s activities as 
“factually similar” to those in In re Cordis, the Eastern District applied the 
permanent-and-continuous analysis and found that the employee’s exclusive 
contract as a sales executive working full-time within the Eastern District with 
the “administrative support” from Cray satisfied the “regular and established 
place of business” condition.118 
To clarify Cordis and “adapt[ ] . . . to the modern era,” the court in Raytheon v. 
Cray also enumerated four factors intended to act as “guideposts” in a “tailored 
‘totality of the circumstances’ approach”: (1) defendant’s physical presence (for 
instance through a retail store or warehouse); (2) defendant’s representations 
(that it has a presence, whether internally or externally); (3) benefits received by 
defendant from its presence in the district (with sales revenue being relevant but 
 
 111 Id. (citing Holub Indus., Inc. v. Wyche, 290 F.2d 852, 854 (4th Cir. 1961); Gen Radio Co. 
v. Superior Elec. Co., 293 F.2d 949, 951 (1st Cir. 1961); Phillips v. Baker, 121 F.2d 752, 756 
(9th Cir. 1941); Warner-Lambert Co. v. C.B. Fleet Co., 583 F. Supp. 519, 522 (D.N.J. 1984); 
Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Kransco Mfg., Inc. 247 F. Supp. 571, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)). 
 112 Id. (citing various degrees of austerity in Mastantuono v. Jacobsen Manufacturing Co., 
184 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412, 
1424 (E.D. Wis. 1983); Instrumentation Specialties Co. v. Waters Assocs., Inc., No. 76 C 4340, 
1977 WL 22810, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 1977); Shelter-Lite, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., 356 F. Supp. 
189, 195 (N.D. Ohio 1973)). 
 113 In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 114 Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 794. 
 115 Cordis, 769 F.2d at 734. 
 116 Id. at 735. 
 117 Id. at 737 (emphasis added). 
 118 Id. at 793–794. 
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not essential); and (4) defendant’s targeted interactions with the district.119  These 
factors, enumerated by Judge Randy Gilstrap in the Eastern District, became 
known as the “Gilstrap test” and temporarily “grant[ed patent plaintiffs] a 
lifeline”120 by making it easier to predict and litigate suits against generic patent 
infringers. 
Relief was short-lived, however, for the Federal Circuit granted Cray’s 
petition for a writ of mandamus in In re Cray Inc. and ordered Judge Gilstrap to 
transfer the case to the Western District of Wisconsin. 121 The Federal Circuit 
found that the Eastern District “misunderstood the scope and effect” of Cordis122 
and determined that the four-factor Gilstrap test was “[in]sufficiently tethered” 
to the statute’s language because it (1) inappropriately expanded the physical 
location requirement, (2) overlooked the requisite regularity for a place of 
business, and (3) mistakenly relied on an employee’s place of business rather than 
a place established by the business itself.123  Instead, the Federal Circuit found 
that three requirements are necessary to find that a defendant had a “regular and 
established place of business” in the district: “(1) there must be a physical place 
in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established place of business; and (3) 
it must be the place of the defendant.  If any statutory requirement is not 
satisfied, venue is improper . . . “124  In doing so, the Federal Circuit created a 
third requirement for venue in patent infringement suits: “the ‘place’ . . . must be 
that of the defendant,” not their employee.125  The Federal Circuit justified this 
more narrow interpretation of § 1400(b) by arguing that the statute was designed 
to be a “restrictive measure”126 that “g[ave] original jurisdiction to the court 
where [only] a permanent agency transacting the business is located”127 in order to 
“eliminate the ‘abuses engendered’ “ by other venue statutes.128  The Federal 
Circuit concluded its opinion by noting that “no one fact is controlling,”129 but 
most industry experts have proffered that “the Federal Circuit put a ‘nail in the 
 
 119 Id. at 796–99. 
 120 Stoll, supra note 99. 
 121 871 F.3d 1355, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 122 Id. at 1359 (citing In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 123 Id. at 1362–63. 
 124 Id. at 1360.  Contrast this approach with that of Judge Gilstrap, who applied a totality of 
the circumstances analysis that required consideration of “other realities present in individual 
cases,” in order to avoid “the siren call of bright line rules.” Raytheon, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 799.  
See also Doyle, supra note 30. 
 125 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1362. 
 126 Id. (quoting Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 66 (1942)). 
 127 Id. at 1361 (quoting 29 CONG. REC. 1900 (1897) (statement of Rep. Lacey) (emphasis 
added). 
 128 Id. (quoting Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 260, 262 (1961)). 
 129 Id. at 1366. 
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coffin on forum shopping in patent cases’ “ when it overturned the Gilstrap 
test.130 
Ultimately, Cray did not help its employee select a location for his home and 
Cray did not store materials at the home; as a result, the Federal Circuit refused 
to find that Cray’s employee’s home satisfied the third “place of the defendant” 
element.131  The Federal Circuit’s more narrow interpretation of the statute 
mimics the Supreme Court’s “textualist interpretation”132 in TC Heartland, 
eliminating much of the uncertainty that abounded after the Supreme Court’s 
May Heartland ruling133 and aligning the approaches to patent venue suits in the 
two courts.134 
D.  IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL CONTEXT 
Through Cray, the Federal Circuit clarified confusion for district courts 
caught in the back-and-forth between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit 
over the scope of the patent venue provision.135  Nevertheless, because the 
Hatch-Waxman Act creates a “unique posture”136 for litigants, application of TC 
Heartland in pharmaceutical patent suits remains uncertain. 
1.  The Hatch-Waxman Act.  Passed in 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act137 was 
adopted in order to address a “pharmaceutical marketplace dominated by 
 
 130 Patrick H.J. Hughes, Attorneys weigh in on impact of Federal Circuit patent venue ruling, WL 
INTELL. PROP. DAILY BRIEFING, 2017 WL 4295782 (Sept. 28, 2017) (quoting interview with 
Jeremy Elman, Attorney, Dorsey & Whitney). 
 131 Id. at 1363. 
 132 Robert G. Bone, Forum Shopping & Patent Law—A Comment on TC Heartland, 96 TEX. L. 
REV. 141, 141 (2017). 
 133 See Bart Rankin & Yoon Chae, Federal Circuit Provides Standard for Interpreting ‘Regular and 
Established Place of Business’ for Patent Venue, BAKER MCKENZIE (Sept. 26, 2017), 
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/09/standard-patent-venue/ 
(“The Federal Circuit’s Cray decision . . . provides needed guidance.”). 
 134 See Jonathan D.J. Loeb et al., Federal Circuit Brings More Clarity to Rules Governing Proper 
Venue for Patent Cases, DECHERT LLP (Sept. 2017), https://info.dechert.com/10/9377/ 
september-2017/federal-circuit-court-brings-more-clarity-to-rules-governing-proper-venue-
for-patent-cases.asp?sid=1a6e94cf-966c-490e-b720-7359884fc294# (finding that “recent 
rulings from the Supreme Court (TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 
1514 (2017)) and the Federal Circuit (In re Cray Inc., No. 2017-129) are making it easier for 
defendants to escape the Eastern District for friendlier venues”). 
 135 The Cray decision is binding on district courts because, “in matters unique to patent law, 
[the Federal Circuit] applies its own law . . . [t]hus, Federal Circuit law, rather than regional 
circuit law, governs [the] analysis of what § 1400(b) requires.”  In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 136 Ondrick, supra note 27. 
 137 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).  Its common name, the Hatch-Waxman Act, is 
derived from the original sponsors of the bill as introduced in Congress, Senator Orrin Hatch 
and Representative Henry Waxman. 
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expensive brand-name drugs despite their patent protection having lapsed.”138  
The goal of the Act during implementation was two-fold:139 it aimed to 
incentivize branded pharmaceutical manufacturers to create new drugs and 
expedite the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) approval of generic drugs, 
which are “therapeutically equivalent to brand-name products” but are also far 
less expensive to produce and to purchase.140 
For brand-name manufacturers, the Hatch-Waxman Act grants innovative 
products five years of exclusive market control following FDA approval.141  For 
generics, the Hatch-Waxman Act established the Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) process, under which generic manufacturers can make one 
of four claims about the patented drug at issue.142  The last of these claims, 
known as a “Paragraph IV” certification,143 allows generic drug manufacturers 
to request expedited approval of the generic drug by asserting that the branded 
drug either has an “invalid” patent or its patent “will not be infringed by the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug.”144 The first generic drug 
manufacturer to successfully challenge a brand-name manufacturer’s patent 
receives a six-month period of market exclusivity.145  However, generic 
challengers must notify the branded manufacturer of their ANDA upon making 
a Paragraph IV certification, and brand-name pharmaceutical companies are then 
given forty-five days to file a patent infringement suit.146  If the branded 
manufacturer files suit, the FDA will wait thirty months before granting final 
approval of the ANDA filer’s application.147 
 
 138 Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-
Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 293, 295 (2015). 
 139 Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that Hatch-
Waxman “aimed to strike a balance between . . . induc[ing] name-brand 
pharmaceutical[s] . . . to develop new drug products, while simultaneously enabling 
competitors to [make] cheaper, generic copies” (quoting aaiPhrma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 
227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002))). 
 140 Kesselheim, supra note 138, at 295. 
 141 Id. at 305. 
 142 Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1586 (1984) (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1984)). 
 143 Kesselheim, supra note 138, at 305. 
 144 Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1586 (1984) (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1984)). 
 145 See Kesselheim, supra note 138, at 304 (“The Act afforded a six-month period of market 
exclusivity to the first generic manufacturer to certify that the . . . brand-name manufacturer’s 
patents were invalid or not infringed.”). 
 146 Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1589 (1984) (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1984)).  For this reason, brand-name manufacturers are generally the 
plaintiffs in patent infringement suits. 
 147 Id. at 1594. 
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Prior to TC Heartland, branded manufacturers who filed suit within the forty-
five-day deadline were able to do so in a number of different jurisdictions, 
including filing multiple Hatch-Waxman claims against separate ANDA filers in 
a single jurisdiction.148  This flexibility was made possible by a 2016 Federal 
Circuit opinion, Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,149 where the 
court found that a generic drug company in a Hatch-Waxman suit was subject to 
personal jurisdiction anywhere the company intended to market its product.150 
2.  The Federal Circuit in Acorda Therapeutics.  In Acorda, plaintiff Acorda 
Therapeutics filed suit in the District of Delaware alleging that generic 
manufacturer Mylan infringed on its patents when Mylan applied for FDA 
approval to market its generic versions of drugs Ampyra®, Onglyza®, and 
Kombiglyze.™151  Though Mylan is incorporated in West Virginia and prepared 
and submitted its ANDA filings in West Virginia, Mylan also made the “costly, 
significant step of applying to the FDA for approval to engage in future 
activities . . . that will be purposefully directed at Delaware.”152  Because of the 
“close connection” between an ANDA filing and future minimum contacts, the 
Acorda court determined Mylan’s ANDA filing to be a “concrete, non-artificial 
act[ ] of infringement” because it was “tightly tied, in purpose and planned effect, 
to the deliberate making of sales in Delaware.”153  Thus, the court found Mylan 
was subject to personal jurisdiction in Delaware.154 
The Acorda court’s personal jurisdiction analysis is “intimately related to” the 
§ 1400(b) patent venue analysis because, prior to TC Heartland, venue was proper 
anywhere the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction.155  With venue 
proper wherever the generic manufacturer had minimum contacts, and minimum 
contacts satisfied by “planned, non-speculative harmful conduct before it 
occurs,”156 branded pharmaceuticals after Acorda could file a patent infringement 
suit essentially “nationwide.”157  Doing so disadvantaged generic drug 
 
 148 Ainsworth, supra note 20. 
 149 817 F.3d 755, 757 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 625 (2017). 
 150 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., No. 17-397-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155, at 
*8 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017). 
 151 Acorda, 817 F.3d at 757. (Acorda markets Ampyra®, and AstraZeneca markets Onglyza® 
and Kombiglyze™; AstraZeneca also sued Mylan separately. Id. at 757–58.) 
 152 Id. at 759. 
 153 Id. at 760. 
 154 Id. at 764. 
 155 Bristol-Myers, 2017 WL 3980155, at n.6 (citing Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign 
Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 156 Acorda, 817 F.3d at 762 (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). 
 157 Colleen Tracy James & Manuel J. Velez, TC Heartland May Cause Protective Suits In ANDA 
Cases, LAW360 (Mar. 24, 2017, 12:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/903700/tc-
heartland-may-cause-protective-suits-in-anda-cases. 
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manufacturers who made a “conscious decision not to have a presence”158 in a 
particular jurisdiction like Delaware, which is historically patentee-friendly.159  In 
“burden[ing] unnecessarily”160 these generic manufacturers, the Federal Circuit’s 
2016 decision in Acorda disturbed the balance between the interests of brand-
name and generic drug manufacturers in the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
TC Heartland re-jiggered the Hatch-Waxman balancing act once again.  
Though the Federal Circuit later provided some clarity for patent litigants in Cray, 
application of the statute in the context of a Hatch-Waxman suit requires 
additional analysis.  Part III of this Note considers the implications for both 
brand-name pharmaceutical companies and their generic manufacturers of the 
2017 changes in the statutory interpretation of the patent venue statute. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  CRAY-ZINESS FOR THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
While the Cray decision generally calmed the waters of patent infringement 
suits after the Federal Circuit made the decision to bend the knee161 to the 
Supreme Court’s textual interpretation, in the pharmaceutical industry, no higher 
court has yet resolved the confusion among district courts in how to interpret 
prong two of § 1400(b) for Hatch-Waxman litigants.  In the first suit to consider 
the issue, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc.,162 the District of Delaware 
considered what constituted a future act of infringement and a regular and 
established place of business for a Hatch-Waxman litigant.163 
1.  Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Mylan.  In Bristol-Myers, plaintiffs Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. and Pfizer Co. brought suit in Delaware alleging that Mylan [MPI], a 
West Virginia company, infringed upon its patented drug when it submitted an 
ANDA to the FDA.164  While MPI was registered with the Delaware Board of 
Pharmacy, the corporation did not have any real property, addresses, or 
employees in Delaware.165  Bristol-Myers Squibb nevertheless argued MPI’s 
 
 158 Ainsworth, supra note 20. 
 159 Love, supra note 93, at 1. 
 160 See Brief for The Generic Pharmaceutical Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Mylan’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 10, Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 817 
F.3d 755 (2016) (No. 15-1456, 15-1460). 
 161 “[W]hen your enemies defy you, you must serve them steel and fire.  When they go to 
their knees, however, you must help them back to their feet.  Elsewise no man will ever bend 
the knee to you.” GEORGE R.R. MARTIN, A STORM OF SWORDS 122 (Bantam 2013). 
 162 No. 17-397-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at *1–2. 
 165 Id. at *2. 
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ANDA filing constituted an act of infringement and argued the corporation had 
a regular and established place of business in the district.166 
The Bristol-Myers court, like the VE Holding court, began its analysis by noting 
that the issue is one of “first impression”; no court prior to Bristol-Myers has been 
forced to interpret the second prong of § 1400(b) in the Hatch-Waxman 
context.167  The court then addressed the first half of the second prong of 
§ 1400(b): what constitutes an act of infringement in Hatch-Waxman suits?168  
Looking to the text of the statute, the court found it dispositive that Congress 
chose to use the present perfect tense in § 1400(b) when referring to acts of 
infringement by asking where the defendant “has committed” these acts.”169  For 
Hatch-Waxman patent litigants, this choice of language creates “an almost 
impenetrable problem” because a Hatch-Waxman suit is focused on acts where 
the defendant “will” manufacture, sell, or offer to sell a product “in the 
future,”170 while § 1400(b) is focused on acts that have already been 
committed.171  In other words, it is problematic that “the temporal focus of the 
Hatch-Waxman infringement analysis is in the future, not—as is true in 
essentially all other patent infringement suits—the past, or even the present.172 
One particularly complicated facet of this “temporal mismatch” is the safe 
harbor provision of § 271(e), under which a generic drug manufacturer that 
might otherwise have committed patent infringement is saved from litigation if 
the act(s) of infringement are “reasonably related” to an ANDA filing.173  In 
doing so, the safe harbor provision protects generic drug companies from patent 
infringement suits if they have submitted, or plan to submit, an ANDA filing.174  
As a result, “historical conduct that constitutes patent infringement in a typical 
patent lawsuit is expressly and statutorily deemed non-infringing in the context 
of Hatch-Waxman litigation.”175 
 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at *6. 
 168 Id. 
 169 “The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of analyzing ‘Congress’ choice of 
verb tense to ascertain a statute’s temporal reach.’ “ Id. at *6 (quoting Carr v. United States, 
560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010)). 
 170 Id. See Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 760 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(finding that the defendant’s “ANDA filings constitute formal acts that reliably indicate plans 
to engage in marketing of the proposed generic drug”). 
 171 Bristol-Myers, 2017 WL 3980155, at *6. 
 172 Id. (citing Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 760 (Fed. Cir. 
2016)) (emphasis in original). 
 173 Id. at *7 (citing 353 U.S.C. § 271(e)(i) and Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 
545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005)). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
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Though Hatch-Waxman litigants are expressly protected from backward-
looking litigation, § 271(e) allows for the creation of a “ ‘highly artificial act of 
infringement’ [to] precipitate[ ] litigation . . . for the express purpose of resolving 
patent disputes before a generic drug product is launched.”176  Under § 271(e)(2), 
generic drug companies commit an act of infringement if they file an ANDA that 
“seeks approval [of a generic bioequivalent drug] before the expiration of a 
patent covering the branded drug.”177  This “particularized framework” acts as a 
“stand-in” in order to “move [the infringement] forward in time” and in doing 
so resolves the “complete mismatch” between § 1400(b) and § 271(e).178 
In Bristol-Myers, the court found that the “acts of infringement” requirement 
in § 1400(b) was satisfied by MPI’s submission of an ANDA filing because 
“MPI’s ‘ANDA filings are tightly tied, in purpose and planned effect, to the 
deliberate making of sales in Delaware.’ “179  In other words, although MPI had 
not yet infringed on the Bristol-Myers Squibb patent, the Bristol-Myers court 
found the ANDA filing sufficient as an artificial act of infringement, and if the 
FDA approved the generic drug product, it would do so. 
After establishing that § 271(e)(2) created a run-around to satisfy the act of 
infringement requirement in § 1400(b), the Bristol-Myers court considered 
whether MPI had a “regular and established place of business” in Delaware.180  
To start, the Delaware district court analyzed the “regular and established place 
of business” language in § 1400(b) using “ ‘clear and specific’ “ guidance 
provided by the Supreme Court over fifty years ago.181  Under that interpretation, 
the Bristol-Myers court found that “[t]he words of the statute . . . require[]: a (i) 
place of business that is (ii) regular and (iii) established.”182  Aiding in the court’s 
understanding of the statute’s text was “the Federal Circuit’s 1985 decision in In 
re Cordis, 769 F.2d at 733, which mark[ed] the most recent, precedential case 
applying the ‘regular and established place of business’ prong of § 1400(b).”183 
The Bristol-Myers court found that the reasoning in In re Cordis applied to the facts 
at bar and maintained that a “place of business” must have a “meaningful 
physical manifestation” like “a place authorized by the defendant where some 
part of the defendant’s business is done.”184 
 
 176 Id. at *7–8 (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990)) (emphasis 
in original). 
 177 Id. at 7. 
 178 Id. at 6–8. 
 179 Id. at *9 (quoting Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 763 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016)). 
 180 Id. at *1 
 181 Id. at *14 (quoting Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U.S. 262, 62 (1961)). 
 182 Id. 
 183 Bristol-Myers, 2017 WL 3980155, at *14. 
 184 Id. at *14–15. 
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Ultimately, however, Judge Stark found that Mylan’s unique status as a 
generic manufacturer meant that additional venue-related discovery was required 
in order to determine whether MPI satisfied the Cordis test, leaving district courts 
uncertain as to what would satisfy the “regular and established” prong of 
§ 1400(b).185  Ten days later, the Federal Circuit would distinguish Cordis in its 
Cray decision, creating new appellate court guidance based on three similar, but 
not identical, statutory elements: whether there is “(1) a physical place in the 
district; (2) . . . a regular and established place of business; and (3) . . . [a] place of 
the defendant.”186 Nevertheless, Judge Stark’s comment that a company’s 
“constant involvement in Hatch-Waxman litigation . . . must weigh into the 
assessment of whether [a company] has a . . . regular and established place of 
business”187 demonstrates that “there remains some uncertainty as to how the 
district courts will specifically adopt the Cray standard”188 in Hatch-Waxman 
suits. 
2.  Galderma Labs.  The Northern District of Texas created further confusion 
when, following Cray, Judge Barbara Lynn discussed Bristol-Myers in Galderma 
Laboratories, L.P. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.189 and found  “several issues 
with the decision.”190  The Bristol-Myers court had utilized an ANDA filing as a 
“stand-in”191 for an act of infringement in a Hatch-Waxman suit, but Judge Lynn 
criticized the Bristol-Myers rationale as “inconsistent with the plain language” in 
Hatch-Waxman, which “does not identify any act of infringement other than the 
ANDA submission.”192  Referencing the Federal Circuit’s decision in Cray to 
reject Judge Gilstrap’s test as “ ‘not sufficiently tethered’ to the statutory 
language,”193 the Galderma court found it more appropriate to find venue proper 
where the ANDA submission was prepared and submitted.194  As to the “regular 
and established place of business” prong, the Galderma court applied the three 
part test from Cray, requiring: “ ‘(1) a physical place in the district; (2) a regular 
 
 185 Id. at *18 (noting that “Mylan’s business model is in large part predicated upon 
participating in a large amount of litigation, since almost all of the generic drugs Mylan seeks 
to market in the U.S. are [generic] bioequivalent[s]”). 
 186 In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 187 Bristol-Myers, 2017 3980155, at *18. 
 188 Rankin, supra note 133. 
 189 No. 3:17-cv-01076-M, 2017 WL 6505793 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2017). 
 190 Id. at *5. 
 191 Bristol-Myers, 2017 WL 3980155, at *8. 
 192 Galderma, 2017 WL 6505793, at *5. 
 193 Id. (quoting In re Cray, Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). 
 194 Id. at *6 (citing Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 08-cv-00948-LDD, 2009 WL 2843288, at 
*3 n.5 (D. Del. Aug. 13, 2009) (“ ‘[L]ocation of the preparation and submission of the ANDA’ 
is ‘the location of the injury’ for venue purposes in Hatch-Waxman Act cases.”)). 
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and established place of business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant.’ 
“195 
3.  Mallinckrodt and Javelin.  The District of Delaware decided Bristol-Myers 
just before the Federal Circuit’s Cray decision, while the Northern District of 
Texas published Galderma two months later and cites the Cray decision directly 
when criticizing the reasoning in Bristol-Myers.196  While it would appear that the 
interpretation of § 1400(b) is converging around Cray, since Galderma and Cray, 
the District of Delaware has issued multiple decisions further complicating the 
analysis.  In Javelin Pharmaceuticals Inc.  v. Mylan Laboratories Ltd.,197 Judge Stark 
refused to follow Galderma in ruling that a corporate subsidiary could satisfy the 
“place of the defendant” element of § 1400(b)’s second prong.198  Two weeks 
later, however, Judge Stark contradicted his Bristol-Myers analysis in Mallinckrodt 
IP v. B. Braud Medical Inc.,199 finding that “a courthouse is not a place ‘of the 
defendant.’ “200  In short, application of TC Heartland in the pharmaceutical 
industry, even after Cray, remains highly fluid. 
B.  MOVING BEYOND BRISTOL-MYERS AND GALDERMA LAB 
As TC Heartland continues to cause confusion for pharmaceutical litigants, 
branded pharmaceuticals are left wondering how best to proceed.  Some industry 
experts have advised pharmaceutical plaintiffs to file protective suits in order to 
ensure that the company’s statutory thirty-month stay from generic competition 
is protected.201  Others have advised brand-name drug manufacturers to apply 
 
 195 Id. at *7 (quoting In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). 
 196 Id. at *5 (arguing that “the Delaware court’s approach to venue in ANDA cases” is a 
“liberal interpretation” that is “inconsistent with the Federal Circuit’s guidance”). 
 197 C.A. No. 16-224-LPS, 2017 WL 5953296, at *1 (D. Del. Dec. 1, 2017). 
 198 Compare Javelin, 2017 WL 5953296, at *4 (“In the Court’s view, it follows from Cray that 
the ‘place’ of a corporate affiliate or subsidiary of a named defendant may, in some 
circumstances, and similar to the place of a defendant’s employee, be treated as a ‘place of the 
defendant’ “), with Galderma, 2017 WL 6505793, at *8 (“A subsidiary’s presence in the district 
cannot be imputed to the parent for venue purposes.”); See also Scott W. Doyle et al., December 
11, 2017 – TC Heartland Weekly Update, FRIED FRANK LLP (Dec. 11, 2017), 
http://www.friedfrank.com/index.cfm?pageID=25&itemID=7955. 
 199 No. 17-cv-0365, 2017 WL 6383610, at *1 (D. Del Dec. 14, 2017). 
 200 Id. at *7 (quoting In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  By contrast, in 
Bristol-Myers, Judge Stark cited MPI’s appearance “in more than 100 cases in the District of 
Delaware” and “constant involvement in Hatch-Waxman litigation” as a factor in the regular 
and established place of business analysis.  Bristol-Myers, 2017 WL 3980155, at *18.  See also 
Doyle et al., December 26, 2017 – TC Heartland Weekly Update, FRIED FRANK LLP (Dec. 26, 
2017), http://www.friedfrank.com/index.cfm?pageID=25&itemID=7966. 
 201 James, supra note 157. 
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for consolidation of multiple suits against different ANDA filers through 
multidistrict litigation.202 
1.  The Habit of Filing Protective Suits.  Until the Acorda decision in 2016, many 
Hatch-Waxman litigants filed “protective suits,” or suits filed “in the forum 
where jurisdiction over the generic manufacturer is certain,” in order to continue 
litigating the case “even if the first-filed action in the preferred forum is dismissed 
on jurisdictional grounds.”203  Doing so was “protective” of a brand-name 
plaintiff because it ensured that the thirty-month stay preventing an ANDA filer 
from receiving FDA approval and competing against the branded manufacturer 
remained in place. 204 
In construing personal jurisdiction as broadly as it did, the court in Acorda 
“reduce[d] or eliminate[d] the need for protective suits”205 because branded 
pharmaceutical companies were no longer concerned about the court dismissing 
their first-filed action.  When TC Heartland was decided, however, it reinvigorated 
these companies’ concern that their suit would be dismissed and their drug no 
longer assured thirty months of protection from generic competition. 
Although filing protective suits would ensure that pharmaceutical plaintiffs’ 
exclusivity will be preserved for thirty months, the procedural mechanism would 
“increase the costs of litigating ANDA cases.”206  Furthermore, many U.S. 
companies are incorporated in Delaware.207  Delaware courts are already 
overloaded—the district is currently making do with only two active judges, two 
vacancies, and a number of visiting judges, yet is faced with the onslaught of 
patent infringement suits ferreted away from the Rocket Docket.208  Already, 
Delaware courts have had to resort to punting cases outside of the district.209  
Filing protective suits in Delaware would overload Delaware courts even more 
and could exacerbate issues of cost and uncertainty if the case was transferred 
because of a lack of judicial resources. 
2.  Reliance on the Joint Panel for Multidistrict Litigation.  A second solution to the 
uncertainty of pharmaceutical patent venue was floated by the Bristol-Myers court 
 
 202 Patrick M. Arenz et al., Another Prediction About Patent Cases After TC Heartland: More 
Multidistrict Litigation, 94 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 2325 (Sept. 1, 2017). 
 203 James, supra note 157. 
 204 As part of its ANDA approval process, the FDA will stay approval of a generic 
bioequivalent for thirty months while litigation ensues.  A protective suit ensures that this 
thirty-month stay will continue, even if the action filed in plaintiff’s preferred forum is 
dismissed. Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 See Delaware Division of Corporations, supra note 97. 
 208 Nayak, supra note 100. 
 209 Id. (finding that Delaware patent infringement complaints more than doubled between 
May and August). 
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itself: relying on the Joint Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to “create more 
Hatch-Waxman multidistrict litigations.”210  The Bristol-Myers court hinted at the 
possibility of consolidating multiple cases against a single ANDA filer into 
multidistrict litigations (“MDLs”) in response to concern about “the time and 
expense that is required to resolve these cases.”211 
Although MDLs were not commonly used for patent infringement suits prior 
to TC Heartland,212 consolidation could lessen the burden on over-flooded 
Delaware court dockets because “there will be at least some common issues of 
discovery . . . similar claim construction issues, and likely related infringement 
theories and invalidity defenses.”213 
Nevertheless, the Bristol-Myers court found that relying on MDLs is not a 
perfect solution because “the process of creating an MDL often involves 
litigation (adding time and expense) and, even once created, cases are transferred 
to an MDL only for pretrial purposes. They must be transferred back to the 
transferor districts for trial, unless a party waives its right to be transferred 
back.”214  In other words, the ease of consolidating patent infringement suits 
based on common discovery issues may not warrant the time and expense of 
MDLs. Furthermore, there are additional uncertainties associated with using 
MDLs because: (1) “it is unclear exactly how many jurisdictions need to be 
implicated to lead to an MDL transfer”; (2) “it is not clear where cases will go”; 
(3) “there is a lack of clarity as to how similar the accused products must be to 
warrant transfer”; and (4) “it remains to be seen which court is best suited and 
most likely to preside over trials after the conclusion of MDL pretrial 
proceedings.”215 
Ultimately, MDLs, like protective suits, do not represent a particularly 
appealing option for pharmaceutical plaintiffs in patent infringement suits 
because they would increase the time and expense associated with litigation. 
 
 210 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., No. 17-379-LPS, 2017 WL 3980155, *1, 
*12, n.17 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017). 
 211 Id. 
 212 See Arenz, supra note 202 (“To date, this tool has not been used extensively in patent 
cases.”). 
 213 Id. 
 214 Bristol-Myers, 2017 WL 3980155, at *12, n.17 (citations omitted). 
 215 Arenz, supra note 202. 
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Instead, judges216 and industry experts217 have argued that Congressional action 
is needed to update § 1400(b) for the modern era. 
C.  THE EFFICACY OF RELYING ON CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
Members of Congress and others218 assert that legislative action is necessary 
in order to resolve the uncertainty and inefficiency created by TC Heartland.  For 
instance, Representative Darrell Issa, House of Representatives Judiciary 
Committee member and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual 
Property, and the Internet, said in a July 13, 2017 Committee hearing that Judge 
Gilstrap’s attempt to circumvent TC Heartland in Raytheon v. Cray was 
“reprehensible”219 and that his Subcommittee would consider new legislation 
following the creation of the four-part test.220  The Federal Circuit’s later decision 
to reject the Gilstrap test means that legislation on that particular issue is 
unnecessary, but Chairman Issa’s comments are nonetheless indicative of the 
general view that “patent reform is now a staple of Congress’s agenda.”221  
Similarly, Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and 
the Senate Republican High-Tech Task Force, indicated that patent venue 
 
 216 The Federal Circuit impliedly suggested Congressional action was needed when it noted 
that the current patent venue language had not been updated for the modern era.  Scott 
Graham, Federal Circuit: No More Loosey-Goosey Rules on Patent Venue, LAW.COM (Sept. 21, 2017, 
7:43 PM), https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/09/21/federal-circuit-no-more-
loosey-goosey-rules-on-patent-venue/?slreturn=20180008085957 (citing In re Cray Inc., 871 
F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (the court “recognize[s] that the world has changed . . . [b]ut, 
notwithstanding these changes, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s holding in TC 
Heartland . . . we must focus on the full and unchanged language of the statute”)). 
 217 Matthew Bultman, Pharma Groups Urge Justices to Avoid Patent Venue Changes, LAW360 (Mar. 
9, 2017, 8:41 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/900202/pharma-groups-urge-justices-
to-avoid-patent-venue-changes. 
 218 See Alexander Poonai, Note, Hatch-Waxman in the Heartland: Achieving Fair Venue Reform in 
Pharmaceutical Litigation, 27 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 103, 113 (2017) (noting that TC Heartland caused 
a “pendulum [swing] in the opposite direction” away from the “broad discretion to sue” that 
was previously afforded to “pioneer” (or branded) drug manufacturers). Poonai argues that 
new legislation is necessary in order to “centralize the location of Paragraph IV disputes in 
two locations: the Patent Trials and Appeals Board (“PTAB”) and the District of Maryland.” 
Id. at 108. 
 219 The Impact of Bad Patents on American Businesses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Intell. 
Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (July 3, 2017) (statement of 
Rep. Darrell Issa, Member, H. Comm. On the Judiciary), 
https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/impact-bad-patents-american-business/. 
 220 Stoll, supra note 99. 
 221 Paul R. Gugliuzza, How Much Has the Supreme Court Changed Patent Law?, 16 CHI.-KENT J. 
INTELL. PROP. 330, 332-33 (2017). 
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reform is a priority for the 115th Congress.222  While some argue that it is crucial 
to “preserve the balance of power between pioneer and generic 
manufacturers,”223 for the reasons discussed below, this Note argues that 
Congressional reform of the patent system is neither a realistic nor a necessary 
solution. 
1.  Congress’s First Attempt at Reform.  The Federal Circuit anticipated 
Congressional action in In re Cray, when Judge Lourie “recognize[d] that the 
world has changed since 1985,” but felt bound by the “unchanged language of 
the statute.”224  In doing so, the Cray court implicitly suggested that 
Congressional action was needed in order to update the statutory language to fit 
the modern era.225 
In 2011, Congress attempted to adapt to the modern era by passing the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which has since been viewed as the 
“most significant change to the U.S. patent system since” Fourco.226  Through the 
AIA, Congress established Inter Partes Review (IPR), a mechanism for fast-
tracking patent litigation by limiting discovery in order to “improve patent quality 
and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”227  In an IPR 
procedure, any party can petition the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) to review a patent; if that petition is granted, then the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board within the USPTO will determine whether the patent claim is 
valid.228 
Although the more efficient two-step IPR procedure provides a quicker 
mechanism for contesting patent claims than cumbersome district court 
litigation, IPR proceedings unwittingly created further uncertainty in the patent 
litigation world because claims have historically been invalidated at a far higher 
 
 222 Orrin Hatch, Chairman, United States Senate Republican High-Tech Task Force, 
Innovation Agenda for the 115th Congress (Feb. 16, 2017) (transcript available at 
https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/2/hatch-unveils-innovation-agenda-
for-the-115th-congress). 
 223 Poonai, supra note 218, at 108. 
 224 In re Cray, Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Matthew J. Rizzolo et al., 
Federal Circuit Provides Guidance on Patent Venue Post TC Heartland, ROPES & GRAY LLP  
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/alerts/2017/09/Federal-Circuit-
Provides-Guidance-on-Patent-Venue-Post-TC-Heartland.aspx (“[T]he court’s ruling appears 
to imply that any efforts by infringement plaintiffs to extend the patent venue statute to cover 
virtual business locations are better addressed in Congress as opposed to the courts.”). 
 225 In re Cray, 871 F.3d at 1359.  See also Graham, supra note 216. 
 226 Renoj Zachariah, Fighting the Troll Toll: The Case for Judicial Review of the U.S.P.T.O. Director’s 
Denial of a Petition to Institute an Inter Partes Review, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 2273, 2275 (2017). 
 227 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011). 
 228 See Zachariah, supra note 226, at 2276–77 (explaining that “[i]f the petition is granted, 
then, in the second step, the USPTO[ ] . . . will conduct an IPR proceeding and render a 
patentability decision”). 
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rate than in federal district courts.229  Thus, a claimant that files an IPR 
proceeding is not guaranteed, or even reasonably reassured, that his or her claim 
would pass muster in district court litigation.  As a result, IPR proceedings, 
although less expensive and more efficient, have not stemmed the influx of 
litigants filing patent infringement suits. This begs the question: is another 
attempt at reform necessary? 
Some members of Congress believe so. Representative Issa has advanced 
“the possibility of broad IPR reform, not to bring uncertainty, but to further 
empower a system which is considered . . . to be good, but . . . not good 
enough.”230 
Even so, no reform attempt has yet been signed into law, though legislation 
was introduced in both Houses of Congress.231  In February 2017, Senator Hatch 
indicated that reform was imminent “this year,”232 but to patent infringement 
plaintiffs, “it is becoming clear that protection from . . . Congress is not coming 
any time soon.”233  On January 2, 2018, Senator Hatch announced his retirement 
from the United States Senate.234 
Legislative reforms of pharmaceutical industry have been particularly 
lackluster. Lawmakers “have been resistant to making market-specific exclusions 
or changes to patent law” despite any “increase[d] efficiency” because reforms 
would be “politically challenging.”235  Redrafting the Hatch-Waxman Act to 
“embrace the speculative, artificial, and delocalized nature of the current law,” 
for instance, would require Congress to “take a second look at one of the best 
legislative compromises it has produced in recent memory . . . “236 Compromise 
in the current political climate is unlikely given the “contention, polarization and 
antipathy that exists between the two major parties . . . “237  In short, Congress 
 
 229 Joanna Shepherd, Disrupting the Balance: The Conflict Between Hatch-Waxman and Inter Partes 
Review, 6:1 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 14, 17 (2016). 
 230 Issa, supra note 219. 
 231 On June 21, 2017, Senator Christopher Coons introduced the STRONGER Patents Act 
of 2017 to amend the patent infringement provisions in Section 271 and the Inter Partes 
Review provisions in Section 316(a), but the bill has only three co-sponsors and has not been 
considered by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, where it was referred following 
introduction.  The STRONGER Patents Act of 2017, S. 1390, 115th Cong (2017). 
 232 Hatch, supra note 222. 
 233 Stoll, supra note 99. 
 234 Lisa Hagen, Hatch announces retirement from Senate, THE HILL (Jan. 2, 2018, 2:09 PM), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/367082-hatch-to-retire. 
 235 Kesselheim, supra note 138, at 325–26. 
 236 Poonai, supra note 218, at 114, 122. 
 237 Ed Rendell, Opinion, Congress damaged its reputation, but it’s not too late for compromise, THE 
HILL (Dec. 26, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/366435-congress-
damaged-its-reputation-but-its-not-too-late-for-compromise.  While Rendell, the former 
Pennsylvania Governor, proposed how progress toward a legislative compromise might be 
29
Newton: Tightening the Gilstrap: How "TC Heartland" Limited the Pharmaceu
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2018
NEWTON (COMPLETE) (DO NOT DELETE) 10/2/2018  1:42 PM 
284 J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 25:2 
 
needed “some help figuring out how to fix th[e] broken market”238 for 
pharmaceutical litigants. 
2.  Is Another Attempt at Congressional Reform Needed?  Should legislative reform 
be attempted, proposals to amend Hatch-Waxman vary greatly.  Some medical 
professionals have posited that the FDA should fast-track approval of a single 
generic bioequivalent drug when the price of its branded counterpart increases 
quickly.239  By lowering regulation of the bioequivalent alternative, the fast-track 
process would encourage competition in order to lower prices. Alternatively, 
other experts argue that heightened government regulation is needed in order to 
combat the rising costs of prescription drugs.240 
Even if reform were politically and technically tenable, the question would 
remain: should the patent venue statute be updated in order to make it easier for 
branded pharmaceutical companies to sue their generic competitors?  During 
oral arguments prior to its TC Heartland ruling, the Supreme Court expressed 
concern about the impact of its decision on the pharmaceutical industry: “What 
do we do . . . about the — all of the cases, like the pharmaceutical cases that will 
be upended and made completely impractical by ignoring 1391?”241   
This Note nevertheless argues that although pharmaceutical patent 
infringement cases were upended by TC Heartland, the result was not impractical.  
The pharmaceutical industry is plagued by high drug prices, driven in large part 
by a lack of competition from generic manufacturers.  The TC Heartland decision 
inadvertently provides an effective, albeit messy, fix to the problem of high drug 
prices. Namely, the decision impacts drug manufacturers in two major ways: first, 
it  “spe[ ]d up . . . market entry for the generic”; second, it “provide[d] generic 
companies with the ability to think strategically about their jurisdictional 
choices.”242 
 
reached, he lamented “the inability of Congress to work together in a bipartisan fashion to get 
things done.” Id. 
 238 Matthew Herper, After the Martin Shkreli Circus, How Can We Fix Drug Pricing?, FORBES 
(Feb. 4, 2016, 4:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2016/02/04/here-
are-some-solutions-to-the-martin-shkreli-problem/#78c6083bf799. 
 239 Jonathan D. Alpern et al., High-Cost Generic Drugs – Implications for Patients and Policymakers, 
371 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1859–62 (2014).  See also Herper, supra note 238 (arguing that “when a 
dramatic price increase happens,” one possible solution would be to “allow the FDA to fast-
track any generic that comes along”). 
 240 See Weissmann, supra note 3 (“Some experts have suggested . . . [that] the only solution 
to the rising cost of generics, especially for specialty drugs, is more direct government 
regulation.”). 
 241 Tr. Of Oral Arg. at 54, In re TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341). 
 242 The Supreme Court’s TC Heartland Decision: Implications for Hatch-Waxman Litigation, ARENT 
FOX LLP (May 25, 2017), https://www.arentfox.com/newsroom/alerts/supreme-court’s-tc-
heartland-decision-implications-hatch-waxman-litigation. 
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These changes alleviate one of the “fundamental flaws of American oversight 
of the pharmaceutical industry,” which is the belief that “once [a drug company’s] 
patents expire, competition from generics will drive down costs.”243  In theory, 
this belief is sound.244 The FDA’s approval process has historically been so slow, 
however, that it acts as a “barrier to market entry for new generic drug 
manufacturers.”245   
Thus, by imposing a new burden on plaintiffs filing patent infringement suits, 
the Supreme Court did by accident what Congress had been attempting for 
years—re-balance the competition between generic drug manufacturers and 
branded pharmaceutical companies.  The TC Heartland decision did disadvantage 
branded pharmaceuticals, but it did so in a way that counteracted the habit of 
those companies to “play the role of the ‘boy scout,’ [i.e.] agreeing to behave well 
but doing it in a way that prevents further competition in the market.”246  In 
short, TC Heartland eliminated the market advantage previously afforded to 
branded pharmaceuticals by “drastically narrow[ing] the plaintiff’s choice of 
forum” 247 and helping generic drug companies reassert some control over the 
venue where they might be subject to suit. 
To be sure, the solution provided by TC Heartland is imperfect.  It is an 
unorganized run-around to the complex Hatch-Waxman Act that fails to “create 
a . . . centralized solution to the problem at hand.”248  The Supreme Court’s 
decision does not ensure, for example, that generic drug companies will be 
sufficiently incentivized to enter the market, nor does it help lower prices for 
drugs where competition is already in place.249  In the absence of other viable 
solutions, however, TC Heartland provides relief by encouraging, or at least 
hampering the prevention of, generic entry into the market. 
 
 243 Weissmann, supra note 3. 
 244 See Jeremy A. Greene, Can the Government Stop the Next Martin Shkreli?, SLATE (Mar. 22, 
2016,5:45AM),http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2016/03/ 
the_fda_wants_to_stop_the_next_martin_shkreli_by_speeding_up_the_approval.html (“If 
the invisible hand was doing its job balancing supply and demand, any increase in price would 
be met by a flood of new competitors entering the market.”). 
 245 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-706, GENERIC DRUGS UNDER MEDICARE: 
PART D GENERIC DRUG PRICES DECLINED OVERALL, BUT SOME HAD EXTRAORDINARY 
PRICE INCREASES 1 (2016).  The GAO report found that “competition could be increased if 
FDA would approve more abbreviated new drug applications (ANDA), which would allow 
generic drug manufacturers to market a drug, but there is a backlog at FDA.” Id. at 26. 
 246 ROBIN FELDMAN & EVAN FRONDORF, DRUG WARS: HOW BIG PHARMA RAISES PRICES 
AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF THE MARKET 25 (Cambridge University Press 2017). 
 247 Poonai, supra note 218, at 113. 
 248 Poonai, supra note 218, at 114. 
 249 For a general discussion of the continued challenges faced after a barrier to competition 
in the pharmaceutical industry is removed, see Greene, supra note 244. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Until TC Heartland, plaintiffs in patent infringement suits had ample flexibility 
in deciding where to file suit against a generic competitor.  TC Heartland vastly 
limited this flexibility.  But does it matter?  The scope of TC Heartland itself is an 
admittedly narrow “technical issue of statutory interpretation.”250  Nevertheless, 
TC Heartland “attracted widespread public attention”251 for “implicat[ing] 
substantial questions of patent policy and promis[ing] serious real-world 
consequences affecting the future of patent litigation.”252  Though Cray provided 
clarity, the pharmaceutical industry remains plagued by real-world uncertainty. 
This Note argues that the confusion caused by the Supreme Court in TC 
Heartland was a necessary chaos.  By narrowing the number of jurisdictions where 
a pharmaceutical company can file suit against a generic manufacturer, the 
Supreme Court’s decision made it more difficult for patent infringement 
plaintiffs to file suit against their generic competition.  The ruling pushed back 
against brand-name pharmaceutical companies attempting to exploit their 
control of the market to raise drug prices and inadvertently re-balanced the 
seesaw between branded pharmaceutical companies and generic drug 
manufacturers that is at the “heart” of the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
 
 
 250 See Bone, supra note 132 at 141. 
 251 Id. More than thirty amicus briefs were filed by corporations, states, and individuals, 
including one retired Chief Judge from the Federal Circuit and the state of Texas. Id. 
 252 Id. at 141. 
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